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Civilian Oversight and Developments in Less 
Lethal Technologies: Weighing Risks and 
Prioritizing Accountability in Domestic Law 
Enforcement 
Loan K. Le, PhD & Maitria Moua* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The controversial militarization of domestic law enforcement continues. 
Police agencies that are best understood as serving the public and protecting 
public safety continue to take on the training and equipment of our military, 
which focuses instead on information dominance, control, and defeating 
enemy combatants in war. In recent years, reports have emerged that 
hundreds of thousands to millions of Americans are entered into terrorist 
“watchlist” databases by law enforcement and intelligence agencies with no 
public oversight, many documented mistakes, and no real opportunity for 
challenging the listing.1 The last few years have been rife with debate as 
knowledge emerged that the NSA has indeed collected data on millions of 
Americans while simultaneously denying that practice.2 Finally, we know 
that the Pentagon granted almost half a billion dollars of military equipment 
to local law enforcement in 2013 through the Department of Defense (DoD) 
                                                                                                                              
*
 We would like to thank the Seattle Journal for Social Justice for their thoughtful 
comments, suggestions, and outstanding editing team. 
1 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, U.S. GOVERNMENT WATCHLISTING: UNFAIR PROCESS 
AND DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES 1 (2014), available at 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/watchlist_briefing_paper_v3.pdf. 
2Andy Greenberg, Watch Top U.S. Intelligence Officials Repeatedly Deny NSA Spying 
On Americans Over the Last Year, FORBES (June 7, 2013, 11:04 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/06/06/watch-top-u-s-intelligence-
officials-repeatedly-deny-nsa-spying-on-americans-over-the-last-year-videos/. 
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1033 Program, which permits the transfer of excess supplies and equipment 
to local law enforcement agencies.3 
The effect of the militarization of our police agencies on American lives 
is palpable. Journalists and watchdog groups write about the “war on terror” 
coming home because “the weapons that destroyed Afghanistan and Iraq 
[are making] their way to local law enforcement,” which is “wreaking 
havoc on innocent American lives.”4 Media reports on demonstrations in 
Ferguson, Missouri, following 18-year-old Michael Brown’s death depicted 
local law enforcement as an occupying force, with automatic rifles, tear gas, 
and “riot gear-clad officers . . . standing in front of a mine-resistant ambush 
protected vehicle, barking commands and launching tear gas into groups of 
demonstrators and journalists.”5 As a result of the public outrage that 
emerged during and after the Ferguson events, public figures such as Sen. 
Claire McCaskill (Democrat, Missouri) and Sen. Rand Paul (Republican, 
                                                                                                                              
3 Christopher Ingraham, The Pentagon Gave Nearly a Half a Billion Dollars of Military 
Gear to Local Law Enforcement Last Year, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/08/14/the-pentagon-gave-
nearly-half-a-billion-dollars-of-military-gear-to-local-law-enforcement-last-year/. 
Although the White House made the decision to ban law enforcement agencies from 
obtaining some military equipment such as weaponized aircraft and high-caliber weapons 
from the U.S. government, the “vast majority of the military-style equipment distributed 
by 1033 would still be available to local agencies.” Police agencies also can still obtain 
equipment directly from private manufacturers. Eyder Peralta & David Eads, White 
House Ban On Militarized Gear For Police May Mean Little, NPR (May 21, 2015), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/05/21/407958035/white-house-ban-on-
militarized-gear-for-police-may-mean-little.  
4 Alex Kane, Not Just Ferguson: 11 Eye-Opening Facts about America’s Militarized 
Police Forces, BILLMOYERS.COM (Aug. 13, 2014), http://billmoyers.com/2014/08/13/not-
just-ferguson-11-eye-opening-facts-about-americas-militarized-police-forces/; see also 
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION OF 
AMERICAN POLICING 17 (2014), available at 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-warcomeshome-report-web-rel1.pdf.  
5 Jamelle Bouie, The Militarization of the Police: It’s Dangerous and Wrong to Treat 
Ferguson, Missouri, as a War Zone, SLATE (Aug. 13, 2014, 1:15 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/08/police_in_ferguson_mi
litary_weapons_threaten_protesters.html.   
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Kentucky) have called for the demilitarization of law enforcement.”6 
Conservatives have written about “a new era of American policing, where 
cops increasingly see themselves as soldiers occupying enemy territory,”7 
while others express concerns about “overkill” by local police forces. Still 
others underscore that, as of yet, some of those who have come forward 
expressing these apprehensions are still “not worried enough.”8 Note that 
conservatives are traditionally understood as “tough on crime” rather than 
“soft on crime.”9  
Given these developments, we underscore the need for enhanced civilian 
oversight of domestic law enforcement with rapidly evolving technologies 
that create tremendous new risks for undetected abuse. Faced with these 
large-scale shifts toward the militarization of our police agencies, 
Americans need to grapple with current and anticipated changes in police-
civilian relations, but even interested and educated citizens face a sea of bad 
material posted online.  
The purpose of this article is to conduct an analysis of available data on 
the existing implementation of conducted energy devices (CEDs) in order to 
highlight risks and potential challenges to ethical policing and civilian 
                                                                                                                              
6 Catalina Camia, Sen. Paul on Ferguson: 'Impossible' for Blacks Not to Feel Targeted, 
USA TODAY (Aug. 14, 2014, 1:32 PM), http://onpolitics.usatoday.com/2014/08/14/rand-
paul-police-ferguson-race/.   
7 Matthew Harwood, Martial Law Enforcement: How the Excessive Militarization of the 
Police is Turning Cops into Counterinsurgents, THE AM. CONSERVATIVE (Aug. 14, 
2014), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/martial-law-enforcement/. 
8 Gene Healy, Just Wait until Ferguson Police Get Federally Funded Drones, 
WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 18, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/just-
wait-until-ferguson-police-get-federally-funded-drones/article/2552138. 
9 Pat Garofalo, Soft on Crime Part Two: The GOPs Scare Tactics Put Criminal Justice 
Scare Tactics Put Reform at Risk, US NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 18, 2015), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2015/09/18/has-2016-tough-on-crime-
talk-already-doomed-criminal-justice-reform. 
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oversight with ongoing less lethal (or nonlethal)10 weapons development 
and implementation. The analysis relies on a key dataset—the Police 
Executive Research Forum’s (PERF) 2011 Evaluation of Less-Lethal 
Technologies on Police Use-of-Force Outcomes in 13 Sites in the United 
States, 1992-2007.11 Based on these findings, we provide a series of 
recommendations for civilian oversight of law enforcement. For example, 
going forward, as law enforcement develops weapons and surveillance 
technologies, members of the public can implement public records requests 
to obtain data in their domains of interest for auditing and oversight. Also, 
civilian review boards must have the resources to undertake rigorous 
training on how to evaluate claims of abuses with new less lethal 
technologies. 
II. GROWING INTEREST IN LESS LETHAL TECHNOLOGIES  
In addition to weapons manufacturers and retailers who have an obvious 
and vested interest in promoting their own products, some experts have 
begun to advocate for the use of the latest nonlethal weapons in policing. 
For instance, Eugene O’Donnell, professor at the John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice, stated recently in the New York Times that “the one truly 
indispensable military technology the police should hurry into service is 
reliable nonlethal weaponry—like the Pentagon’s so-called pain ray. It is 
hard to believe that in the year 2014, police officers have to take lives just 
to enforce the law”; but importantly, he adds that training and “robust 
oversight” are central to the judicious use of emerging sophisticated 
                                                                                                                              
10 Greg Meyer, Nonlethal or Less-lethal: Does it Matter?, POLICEONE.COM (May 1, 
2006), http://www.policeone.com/less-lethal/articles/131840-Nonlethal-or-Less-Lethal-
Does-it-matter/. 
11 BRUCE TAYLOR & CHRIS KOPER, EVALUATION OF LESS-LETHAL TECHNOLOGIES ON 
POLICE USE-OF-FORCE OUTCOMES IN 13 SITES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1992-2007 ii 
(2013), available at http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR27561.v1. 
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weaponries.12 Less lethal weapons are designed to (1) “incapacitate people 
or disable equipment,” (2) “discriminate and not cause unnecessary 
suffering,” (3) have effects that are “temporary and reversible,” and (4) 
“provide alternatives to, or raise the threshold for, use of lethal force.”13 
According to the research and development arm of the Department of 
Justice, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), there are seven categories of 
less lethal technologies: (1) CEDs, (2) directed energy devices, (3) 
chemicals, (4) distraction tools, (5) vehicle-stopping technology, (6) 
barriers, and (7) blunt force, with some manufacturers integrating numerous 
effects into a single device.14 Proponents who argue that less lethal 
technologies are preferable to lethal weapons for deployment in police-
civilian interactions because they can save lives and minimize injuries to 
officers and suspects underscore an important point. But, these weapons are 
also accompanied by risks that should be evaluated.  
Through efforts of the DoD’s Joint Nonlethal Weapons Program,15 the 
NIJ,16 and private contractors such as Raytheon Company,17 the military 
                                                                                                                              
12 Eugene O’Donnell, Military Training and Technology May Actually Cut Risk, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 28, 2014, 6:20 PM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/08/14/are-police-forces-excessively-
armed/military-training-and-technology-for-police-may-actually-cut-risk. 
13 NICK LEWER & NEIL DAVISON, NON-LETHAL TECHNOLOGIES: AN OVERVIEW, 
DISARMAMENT FORUM 37 (2005), available at 
http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/UNIDIR_pdf-art22. 
14
 Types of Less-Lethal Devices, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., 
http://www.nij.gov/topics/technology/less-lethal/pages/types.aspx (last visited Aug. 9, 
2015). 





16 David Hambling, Police Toy with ‘Less Lethal’ Weapons, NEW SCIENTIST (May 2, 
2005), https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn7326-police-toy-with-less-lethal-
weapons/#bx249758B1.  
17 Research and Markets: North American Non-Lethal Weapons Market by Type, by 
Technology, by Application, by Country Analysis and Forecast (2014-2019), BUS. WIRE 
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and our law enforcement agencies will have access to increasingly 
sophisticated energy weapons that can be fired at targets from a distance. 
New models of CEDs (often called by the brand name of Taser) have been 
developed so that they no longer need wires and barbs to stun a suspect.18 
The Active Denial System (ADS) is a less lethal weapons technology able 
to target individuals with millimeter wave-directed energy to deter potential 
adversaries who would feel intense heat and pain sensations.19 Domestic 
law enforcement has expressed some interest in this technology. In 2010, 
the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department reported an interest in using a 
nonlethal, directed energy Assault Intervention Device to stop or lessen the 
likelihood of assaults among inmates.20 Although often depicted as vehicle-
mounted weapons, the NIJ has worked with Raytheon on hand-held 
equivalents of the military’s ADS for domestic law enforcement.21 
Similarly, the Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) is a weapon that 
achieves sound projection from a distance by sending focused sound waves 
to issue authoritative commands or create powerful and painful deterrent 
                                                                                                                              
(Apr. 24, 2015, 1:46 PM), available at 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150424005787/en/Research-Markets-North-
American-Non-Lethal-Weapons-Market#.VcExyvlp_w0. “The key companies operating 
in this market include NonLethal Technologies, Inc. (U.S.), TASER International, Inc. 
(U.S.), Raytheon Company (U.S.), Lamperd less Lethal Inc. (Canada), LRAD 
Corporation (U.S.), and AMTEC Less-Lethal Systems, Inc. (U.S.).” Id.  
18 David Hambling, Wireless Taser: Whole New Kind of Weapon, WIRED (July 6, 2007, 
6:58 AM), http://www.wired.com/2007/07/taser-goes-wire/. 
19 WEAPONS & PROTECTIVE SYS. TECH. CTR., A GUIDEBOOK FOR LESS-LETHAL 
DEVICES: PLANNING FOR, SELECTING, AND IMPLEMENTING TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS 
18 (2010), available at https://www.justnet.org/pdf/WPSTC-GUIDE-FINAL-
(2010.05.07)-COMPLETE.pdf. 
20 Thomas Watkins, LA Authorities Plan to Use Heat-Beam Ray in Castaic Jail, L.A. 
DAILY NEWS (Sept. 25, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.dailynews.com/20100826/la-
authorities-plan-to-use-heat-beam-ray-in-castaic-jail. 
21 David Hambling, Infra-Red Pain Beams For Police, Military, WIRED (Dec. 24, 2008, 
9:28 AM),  http://www.wired.com/2008/12/pain-beams-go-i/.  
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tones when directed at intended targets.22 The San Diego County Sheriff’s 
Department procured an LRAD 500X in 2008, and it notes that one of the 
dangers is that the “LRAD can cause temporary or permanent hearing 
damage if operated at the maximum volume and if persons are within 75 
meters of the front of the device.”23 
More generally, interest in the development of and reporting on less 
lethal weapons and other technologies across the electromagnetic 
spectrum—which is omnipresent in our everyday lives, including via radio 
waves, microwaves, ultraviolet, X-rays, gamma rays—and across the 
acoustic spectrum, has grown substantially over the last decade in the 
scholarly community. We used Google Scholar (a search engine that 
enables a broad search of scholarly literature including academic articles, 
books, abstracts, and court opinions) to assess research trends. Figure 1 
charts the growth in counts of articles from Google Scholar for selected 
search phrases within this domain. Scholarly interest in directed energy 
weapons peaked in 2012 at 518 article counts but remained high in 2014 at 
399. Interest in the ADS peaked in 2009 at 56 counts (33 articles for 2014). 
Interest in the LRAD peaked in 2012 with 45 counts (33 articles for 2014). 
Interest in less lethal, or nonlethal weapons broadly, has also grown steadily 
over time, with 29 articles in 2000 and 115 articles in 2014. CEDs comprise 
one of the weapons categories with greatest sustained interest over time, 
with over 100 articles in 1991, 229 in 2001, 203 in 2004, peaking at 920 in 
2012, and remaining high in 2014 with 886 scholarly articles. The most 
striking trend is that for the growing industry that encompasses nonlethal 
weaponry, vis-a-vis the electromagnetic spectrum. Searched as 
                                                                                                                              
22 Natasha Lennard, Chicago Cops’ New Weapons, SALON (May 14, 2012, 8:54 AM), 
http://www.salon.com/2012/05/14/chicago_cops_new_weapon/. 
23 SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEP’T, LONG RANGE ACOUSTIC DEVICE (LRAD) 
(n.d.), available at http://www.sdsheriff.net/newsroom/lrad.pdf. 
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“electromagnetic warfare” or “electronic warfare”24 in Google Scholar, 
interest was high in 1996 with 1,050 article counts, peaking in 2010 with 
4,050 article counts, and remaining high in 2014 with 2,160 article counts. 
This is a growing industry, and there are over one thousand jobs posted on 
indeed.com when “electromagnetic warfare” and “United States” are 
entered into the fields for keywords and location (as of May 1, 2015). 
 
Figure 1.  Comparing Growth in Counts of Articles from Google Scholar 
for Less Lethal Technologies.25 
                                                                                                                              
24 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (CJCS) - ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13.1 ELECTRONIC WARFARE v (2007), 
available at http://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-13-1.pdf. Electronic warfare “includes three 
major subdivisions: electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic 
warfare support (ES). EA involves the use of EM energy, directed energy, or 
antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of 
degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form 
of fires.” Id.  
25 Source: Figure shows counts of returns on Google Scholar search (as of May 10, 2015 
on scholar.google.com) with a search for articles by year and by the search terms 
provided in the legend. 
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III. TACKLING THE PROBLEMS WITH LESS LETHAL WEAPONS 
While the use of less lethal weapons may have advantages in policing, 
there are caveats to consider by all stakeholders moving forward. These new 
weapons pose challenges to the police oversight community because those 
that are based on the electromagnetic spectrum, such as the ADS, are silent 
and invisible to the naked eye.26 Yet they rely on pain compliance.  A 
typical response to ADS targeting is, as demonstrated by one test subject, an 
“intolerable heating sensation” with an immediate desire to move away 
from the beam.27 Oversight professionals may find it difficult to monitor 
and audit how frequently, at what intensity, and at which targets these 
weapons are aimed and discharged; therefore, the features of these weapons 
call attention to substantial risks for undetected abuse. 
Although we would be correct to observe that there are moral, rational, 
and even heroic individuals among us—notably in fields with higher risk, 
such as policing28 and military service29—we must not be so naive as to 
                                                                                                                              
26 NASA Science Mission Directorate, Visible Light, NASA, 
http://missionscience.nasa.gov/ems/09_visiblelight.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2015). “All 
electromagnetic radiation is light, but we can only see a small portion of this radiation—
the portion we call visible light. Cone-shaped cells in our eyes act as receivers tuned to 
the wavelengths in this narrow band of the spectrum. Other portions of the spectrum have 
wavelengths too large or too small and energetic for the biological limitations of our 
perception.” Id. 
27 Aaron Smith, Wanted at Police Departments: Guns That Don't Kill, CNN.COM (Feb. 
16, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/02/16/technology/less-lethal-weapons/. 
28 For poignant examples from recent years, see Celebrating 15 cops who saved lives in 
2014, POLICEONE.COM (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.policeone.com/police-
heroes/articles/7982463-Celebrating-15-cops-who-saved-lives-in-2014/; The '12 Knights' 
of Christmas 2013, POLICEONE.COM (Dec. 24, 2013), http://www.policeone.com/Officer-
Safety/articles/6689805-The-12-Knights-of-Christmas-2013/; 2012 in Review: The ‘12 
Knights of Christmas’ 2012, POLICEONE.COM (Dec. 10, 2012), 
http://www.policeone.com/patrol-issues/articles/6059818-2012-in-Review-The-12-
Knights-of-Christmas-2012/; Michael Konatsotis & David Roussine, Hero Cops Save 
Unconscious Baby's Life, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 2, 2014, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/02/nypd-saves-baby_n_4884928.html.  
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ignore scholarship with regard to variation in personality traits. The latest 
research in this domain has found that subclinical sadism is much more 
prevalent than previously understood, with “those who enjoy inflicting at 
least moderate pain on others, directly or vicariously, mingl[ing] with us 
daily.”30 In a seminal study in 2013, dark personalities, such as sadists, 
psychopaths, narcissists, and those with low empathy, all aggressed against 
innocents; but so-called everyday sadists are distinguished by how much 
they enjoy cruelty or harming others.31 Given the opportunity to blast an 
opponent with white noise who was guaranteed not to retaliate, “sadists 
were also the only dark personalities willing to work (i.e., expend time and 
energy) to hurt an innocent person,” and “only sadists increased the 
intensity of their attack once they realized that the innocent person would 
not fight back.”32 Although this work should not be taken to imply that law 
enforcement personnel are dominated by everyday sadists, Professor Delroy 
Paulhus of the University of British Columbia does note that everyday 
sadists may be drawn to jobs in law enforcement and the military because 
                                                                                                                              
29 See the following for Medal of Honor Recipients, although there are many unsung 
military heroes not on the list. Medal of Honor Recipients, U.S. ARMY CTR. OF MIL. 
HIST., http://www.history.army.mil/moh/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2015). “The President, in 
the name of Congress, has awarded more than 3,400 Medals of Honor to our nation’s 
bravest Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen since the decoration's 
creation in 1861.” Id.; Rebecca Gordon, These 6 Military Heroes Spoke Out Against 
Torture After 9/11: Their Choices Prove that Bush, Cheney, & Co. Could Have Said No 
as Well, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 10, 2015 8:29 PM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/02/military-heroes-no-torture-bush-cheney. 
“Some of those who rejected torture, like CIA official John Kiriakou and an as-yet-
unnamed Navy nurse, directly refused to practice it. Some risked reputations and careers 
to let the people of this country know what their government was doing. Sometimes an 
entire agency, like the FBI, refused to be involved in torture. I'd like to introduce you to 
six of these heroes . . . .” Id. 
30 Jan Hoffman, ‘Everyday Sadists’ Among Us, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2013, 4:50 PM), 
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/16/everyday-sadists-among-
us/?emc=edit_tnt_20130917&tntemail0=y&_r=3&. 
31 Erin E. Buckels et al., Behavioral Confirmation of Everyday Sadism, PSYCHOLOGICAL 
SCI. 1, 7 (2013).  
32 Id. at 7. 
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they can harm others based on the pretext of a legitimate position.33 This 
work has gained the attention of the military, which wants to understand 
why some people abuse their positions and potentially weed out dark 
personalities before they are hired.34 
In cases where police and military agency officials do abuse their powers, 
some might argue that we can rely on whistleblowers to spot and notify the 
proper authorities of wrongdoing. But in reality, we must not rely primarily 
on those courageous enough to step forward and to report wrongdoing. As 
demonstrated by recent reports, substantial institutional disincentives to 
whistleblowing exist.35 The Government Accountability Office found FBI 
employees have only a limited list of officials to which whistleblowers can 
make protected complaints about waste, fraud, or governmental abuse (in 
order to be protected from retaliation by senior management).36 
Additionally, FBI employees found the process “confusing” and 
                                                                                                                              
33 Douglas T. Kenrick, The Four “Dark Personality” Traits: Distinguishing 
Psychopaths, Narcissists, Machiavellians, and Everyday Sadists, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 
(Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/sex-murder-and-the-meaning-
life/201412/the-four-dark-personality-traits. 
34 David Robson, Psychology: The Man Who Studies Everyday Evil, BBC.COM (Jan. 30, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20150130-the-man-who-studies-evil. 
35 Kelly Riddell, FBI Hostile to Whistleblowers and Must Change Culture, Lawmakers 
Say, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/mar/4/fbi-must-fix-whistleblower-
retaliation-culture-/?page=all. In March of 2015, in a hearing evaluating how the FBI 
handles its whistleblower cases, both Democrat and Republican lawmakers pressured the 
FBI to change a culture and a structure “from top to bottom” that were seen as “hostile” 
to whistleblowers. Id. 
36 Joe Davidson, Report Says Procedures Put A Chilling Effect on Potential FBI 
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“burdensome.”37 Sen. Charles Grassley, a Republican from Iowa and the 
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, said, “many who come to me express 
fear of reprisal for raising the alarm and are even unclear of their rights as 
whistleblowers.”38 Recently, an FBI whistleblower who investigates 
counterterrorism cases received an email response from an attorney in the 
Office of Integrity and Compliance stating, “I’m sure you know, though, 
this does not guarantee that you will not be retaliated against, even though 
retaliation/reprisal for making protected disclosures is illegal.”39 
Furthermore, Stephen Kohn of the National Whistleblowers Center 
observed, “the FBI has placed its bureaucratic culture ahead of protecting 
Americans from terrorism” and “allowed retaliatory animus and their 
cultural hostility toward whistleblowers to compromise the counterterrorism 
program.”40 The combination of dark personality traits, institutional features 
that are not conducive to whistleblowing, and the development of an array 
of difficult-to-detect less lethal weapons form a cogent basis for enhanced 
and rigorous oversight. 
Those arguments aside, it is important to note that one does not need to 
be a sadist to harm an innocent subject. In his classic study of obedience at 
Yale University, Stanley Milgram showed that, by simply shifting to an 
agentic state wherein the subject rationalizes that he or she is simply 
following the orders of an authority figure, a surprising number of 
participants administered a dangerous volt of energy to innocent persons 
                                                                                                                              
37 Carrie Johnson and Evie Stone, A Decade after Blowing The Whistle on The FBI, 
Vindication, NPR.ORG (Apr. 15, 2015, 4:03 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2015/04/15/398518857/9-years-after-blowing-the-whistle-on-the-fbi-
he-s-been-vindicated. 
38 Robson, supra note 34. 
39 Kelly Riddell, FBI Email Warns Whistleblower of Retaliation if Surveillance Program 
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(those who took on the role of learners).41 In all, 26 of 40 participants who 
assumed the role of teachers obeyed until the end, administering 450 volts 
of energy to the assigned learner.42 Central to our understanding of 
oversight for the implementation of directed energy weapons are the 
varying proximity conditions. When the teacher and learner were located 
next to one another in the same room or especially when the teacher was 
ordered to place the learner’s hand on the shock plate, the close interaction 
between teacher and learner was associated with less compliance. When the 
teacher and learner were located in separate rooms, teachers were more 
likely to shock the learners.43 This has clear implications for the willingness 
of police and military officials (who work within hierarchical, authority-
driven institutions) to fire directed energy weapons against the innocent, 
since these can be aimed and discharged at targets from a distance. 
Milgram’s study is “virtually impossible”44 to replicate ethically in the 
United States today due to modern regulations that provide for stronger 
human subjects protections.45 Milgram undertook his research program in 
                                                                                                                              
41 STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 145–146 
(1974). Milgram stated, “The most far-reaching consequence of the agentic shift is that a 
man feels responsible to the authority directing him but feels no responsibility for the 
content of the actions that the authority prescribes.” Id. Note that the learners were 
actually actors or confederates in the research and therefore, they simulated reactions “as 
if” they were truly being shocked. Milgram’s goal mainly was to study the teacher. Id. 
42 Robert Levine, Milgram’s Progress, AM. SCIENTIST (2004), 
http://www.americanscientist.org/bookshelf/pub/milgrams-progress. 
43 Id. at 35. 
44 INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOC. SCIS. 2 (2nd ed. 2007), available at 
http://www.stanleymilgram.com/pdf/EncyclSocSci.pdf. 
45 Dep’t of Energy, Human Subjects Resources: Protecting Workers Who Are Human 
Research Subjects, PROTECTING HUM. SUBJECTS (Nov. 12, 2013), 
http://humansubjects.energy.gov/doe-resources/worker-brochure.htm. “Since ancient 
times, a doctor’s first commitment to patients is ‘to do no harm.’ The same principle 
applies to research—medical and other types—with human subjects. Protecting research 
subjects from physical harm seems like an obvious requirement. But studies with human 
subjects must also include protections from psychological, social, or economic harm.” Id; 
see also Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2009); Dep’t of Health and Hum. 
Serv., What is Informed Consent and When, Why, and How Must it be Obtained, 
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order to understand “why tens of thousands of ordinary German citizens 
willingly provided the manpower to carry out a massive killing program.”46 
As to whether Milgram’s main findings of destructive obedience (how far 
an individual would go in following orders to harm an innocent 
individual)47 holds up over time given contextual and generational change, a 
review of scholarship in this domain has found that “rates of obedience 
show no systematic change over time.”48  
As with other weapons, less lethal weapons are supposed to be utilized 
judiciously in principle but in practice there are many exceptions. Amnesty 
International and the Omega Research Foundation have documented how 
“law enforcement officials commit a wide range of human rights violations 
using such equipment—including torture and other ill-treatment in custody, 
as well as excessive, arbitrary and unnecessary use of force against 
demonstrators.”49 With the variety of less lethal weapons available, one or 
more unscrupulous or morally disengaged officers could wreck a target’s 
life. Using directed energy weapons, an unfortunate target’s means of work, 
transportation, communication, and safety could be affected. For instance, 
directed energy weapons could be used to fry the electronics of a target,50 
which would cause a target's computer, car, cell phone, surveillance 
cameras, and alarm system to stop working. With next-generation less lethal 
                                                                                                                              
HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/faq/informed-consent/what-is-informed-
consent.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2015). 
46 Levine, supra note 42.  
47 Id.  
48 Thomas Blass, The Milgram Paradigm After 35 Years: Some Things We Now Know 
About Obedience to Authority, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 955, 972 (1999).  
49 The Human Rights Impact of Less Lethal Weapons and Other Law Enforcement 
Equipment, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 12, 2015), 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/the-human-rights-impact-of-less-lethal-
weapons-and-other-law-enforcement-equipment. 
50 Kelsey D. Atherton, The U.S. Navy Wants Nonlethal Weapons: When You Absolutely, 
Definitely, Need an Option that Isn't Killing Someone, POPULAR SCI. (July 2, 2014), 
http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/us-navy-wants-nonlethal-weapons. 
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technology, even the sanctity of the target's home could be made extremely 
uncomfortable.51 With respect to the latter, in 2009, the Joint Nonlethal 
Weapons Directorate sought proposals for “clear-a-space technology” or 
“non-lethal weapons that provide the capability to clear targeted personnel  
. . . and provide the capability to disable individuals within confined/indoor 
spaces.”52  
Portable and precise nonlethal weapons may pose risks for additional 
abuse. The Personnel Halting and Stimulation Response (PHaSR), which 
was funded by the NIJ and the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, can 
be operated by a single individual and is a “rifle-sized laser weapon system 
that uses two non-lethal laser wavelengths to deter, prevent, or mitigate an 
adversary’s effectiveness.”53 A hand-held version of the ADS that the NIJ 
worked with Raytheon to develop had a desired range of about 100 feet, 
with a small beam of just a few inches that would still repel an individual.54 
Whatever the details of new portable weapons as they reach production, 
from an outside observer’s perspective, the potential for undetected abuse 
increases with smaller, more portable versions, as these reduce the potential 
to spot large vehicle-mounted ADS equipment in a given area. Also, since 
the beam of the portable version that has been in development is more 
precise, it could be fired at a targeted person without hitting others around 
him. We must find mechanisms to ensure that each use of force against 
selected targets is reported. Unreported firing of silent, invisible, but painful 
                                                                                                                              
51 Id. 
52 Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate Seeks Clear-A-Space Proposals, KIRTLAND 
AIR FORCE BASE (Nov. 13, 2009), 
http://www.kirtland.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123177575. 
53
 U.S. AIR FORCE RES. LAB., PERSONNEL HALTING AND STIMULATION RESPONSE 
(PHASR) (2006), available at http://www.kirtland.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-
070404-043.pdf. 
54 David Hambling U.S. Eyes ‘Pain Beam’ for Home Security, Law Enforcement, 
WIRED.COM (Dec. 10, 2007), 
http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/12/pain_beam?currentPage=2. 
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weapons against targets would be the foundation for abuse (especially in 
circumstances with prolonged exposure through repeated firing of the 
weapon against a particular target and/or at higher levels of intensity).  An 
obviously problematic situation is one where the target reports truthfully 
that such a weapon has hit him or her repeatedly. Those around would meet 
such a claim with incredulity, since they were present but did not share in 
the same experience. 
Torture has been a substantial part of our national discussion in recent 
years, and critics of less lethal weapons highlight the possibility for the 
torture of targets.55 Security expert Steve Wright at Leeds Metropolitan 
University describes the new weapons as “torture at the touch of a 
button.”56 A prominent example of torture that has been a part of our 
national conversation in recent years came to the fore when we learned of 
details of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation tactics in the Senate Intelligence 
Committee report. After the release of the CIA torture report, Sen. Diane 
Feinstein (Democrat, California) admonished that “the major lesson of this 
report is that regardless of the pressures and the need to act, the intelligence 
community’s actions must always reflect who we are as a nation, and 
                                                                                                                              
55 Brian Martin & Steve Wright, Countershock: Mobilizing Resistance to Electroshock 
Weapons, 3 MED., CONFLICT AND SURVIVAL 205, 205 (2003). “Electroshock, stun and 
restraint technologies are often used for torture and as tools of repression.” Id.; see also 
The Legal Prohibition Against Torture, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 1, 2004), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2003/03/11/legal-prohibition-against-torture. “The prohibition 
against torture is firmly embedded in customary international law, international treaties 
signed by the United States, and in U.S. law. As the U.S. Department of State has noted, 
the ‘United States has long been a vigorous supporter of the international fight against 
torture . . . Every unit of government at every level within the United States is committed, 
by law as well as by policy, to the protection of the individual’s life, liberty and physical 
integrity.’” Id. 
56 David Hambling, U.S. police could get ‘pain beam’ weapons, NEW SCIENTIST (Dec. 
24, 2008), https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16339-us-police-could-get-pain-beam-
weapons/. The article also quotes Amnesty International’s arms control researcher Helen 
Hughes as stating, “We have grave concerns about the deployment and use of any such 
devices, which have the potential to be used for torture or other ill treatment.” Id. 
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adhere to our laws and standards.”57 Although those who defend torture do 
so by defining exceptional circumstances, such as when our “deepest values 
and our collective survival are in imminent danger,”58  the unlawful use of 
less lethal technologies to torture in interrogations and to elicit false 
confessions from innocent individuals would not be new to our national 
history. For example, former police official Jon Burge is perhaps the most 
famous alleged torturer in American history. Burge was a commander in the 
Chicago Police Department and is alleged to have tortured as many as 120 
African American men on Chicago’s South Side between 1972 and 1991.59 
Whenever he needed a confession, “he would walk into the interrogation 
room and set down a little black box, his alleged victims would later tell 
prosecutors . . . he would crank his little black box and listen to the screams 
of pain as electricity coursed through the suspect’s body.”60 Burge was 
convicted of perjury and obstruction of justice in 2010 when he stated that 
he had never tortured suspects.61 In May of 2015, Chicago agreed to pay a 
total of up to $5.5 million to dozens of people tortured by the city's police in 
the 1970s and 1980s,” although Chicago and Cook County previously paid 
approximately $100 million in Burge-related lawsuits.62 
The development of new, less lethal weapons that inflict pain from a 
distance without leaving marks raises concerns about more opportunities for 
                                                                                                                              
57 Carl Hulse, For Dianne Feinstein, Torture Report’s Release Is a Signal Moment, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/us/politics/for-dianne-
feinstein-cia-torture-reports-release-is-a-signal-moment.html. 
58 MICHAEL WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR 33 (2004). 
59 Michael Miller, Cop Accused of Brutally Torturing Black Suspects Costs Chicago $5.5 





62 Fiona Ortiz, Chicago council approves reparations for police torture victims, 
REUTERS.COM (May 6, 2015, 5:22 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/06/us-
usa-police-chicago-idUSKBN0NR1YA20150506. 
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undetected abuse and raises questions about long-term health effects.63 
Repeated abuse of less lethal weapons raises questions, not just about 
psychological and physical torture, but also about basic human effects and 
safety issues. Although the Air Force observes that the ADS is “not 
radioactive, does not cause cancer or infertility, and can only be lethal if the 
energy beam is ‘sustained and prolonged many times,’”64 it is the 
improperly prolonged and repeated firing against an individual that forms 
the basis for many concerns. Furthermore, as an expert in less lethal 
weapons, Dr. Jürgen Altmann of University of Dortmund, observed that real 
life situations could deviate from the 15-second breaks between exposures 
that test subjects were permitted.65 He noted that the ADS 
[p]rovides the technical possibility to produce burns of second and 
third degree . . . Second- and third-degree burns covering more 
than 20% of the body surface are potentially life-threatening—due 
to toxic tissue-decay products and increased sensitivity to 
infection—and require intensive care in a specialized unit. . . . 
Without a technical device that reliably prevents re-triggering on 
the same subject, the ADS has a potential to produce permanent 
injury or death.66  
Previously, national security reporter Sharon Weinberger wrote that the 
ADS  
                                                                                                                              
63 TORTURE AND STATE VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A SHORT DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 255 (Robert M. Pallitto ed., 2011). Torture that leaves no marks on the body is 
consistent with what scholars call “clean torture,” which gained favor in democratic 
societies where constituents have voice and established norms for human rights: “As 
monitoring emerges, states continue to torture, but they employ methods that leave no 
evidence on the body.” Id. at 2.  
64 Smith, supra note 27.  
65 Ed Cumming, The Active Denial System: the weapon that's a hot topic, THE 
TELEGRAPH (July 20, 2010, 11:27 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/science/7900117/The-Active-Denial-System-the-
weapon-thats-a-hot-topic.html. 
66 Id.  
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[i]s specifically designed not to cause any injuries, such as burns. 
There have been several incidents of blistering, however, and the 
most serious accident took place [in April of 2008], when the Air 
Force revealed that an airman taking part in a test of ADS had been 
injured severely enough to be treated at a burn center.  
The injury was due in no small part to a series of operator errors and 
missing safety equipment.67  
Other risks are related to the suppression of dissent as well as 
disproportionate use against certain social and demographic categories. In 
an article for Harper’s Magazine, one writer examined the development of 
less lethal technologies and wrote that, “as outlined in many documents, 
some of them only recently declassified, U.S. policymakers have long 
understood themselves to be engaged in an active arms race with protesters 
both at home and abroad”; however, with the growth of mass 
communications came the exposure of violence, and “governments have 
realized that the public’s perception of injury and bloodshed must be 
carefully managed.”68 Other experts warn, “emerging non-lethal 
technologies offer an increasing opportunity for the suppression of civil 
dissent and control of populations—these are sometimes referred to as the 
‘technologies of political control.”’69 Less lethal weapons like the ADS and 
LRAD, then, can be used as flexible tools of political control while 
undermining oversight and accountability. During the Ferguson 
demonstrations, for example, members of the media asked,  
What could possibly justify police ‘red-dotting’ peaceful protesters 
with laser sights, or an attempted head-shot, with a tear gas 
canister, at a man standing in his own yard, insisting, ‘this [is] my 
                                                                                                                              
67 Sharon Weinberger, Pain Ray Test Subjects Exposed to 'Unconscionable Risks', 
WIRED.COM (Oct. 10, 2008), http://www.wired.com/2008/10/pain-ray-accide/. 
68 Ando Arike, The Soft-Kill Solution: New Frontiers in Pain Compliance, HARPER’S 
MAG. (Mar. 2010), http://harpers.org/archive/2010/03/the-soft-kill-solution/. 
69 LEWER & DAVISON, supra note 13.  
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property!’? Police fumigate a news crew and take down their 
cameras—then chase off the other journalists filming the assault.70  
If directed energy weapons were used against protesters, witnesses, and 
journalists in Ferguson, the American public would not have had visible 
data for evaluations of potential abuse incidents. A similar argument is 
made about what would have happened if the University of California at 
Davis Police Department were to have deployed the ADS against a non-
violent group of young college students sitting together in a line on the 
sidewalk with linked arms during Occupy Wall Street demonstrations in the 
fall of 2011, instead of their controversial use of pepper spray.71 
We must guard against the risks of excessive, unnecessary uses of force 
with less lethal technology—just as we do with lethal force—perhaps 
especially because, unlike traditional gunfire with bullets, casings, and 
entry-exit sites, nonlethal weapons are difficult to detect with traditional 
forensic methods. How can stakeholders identify and evaluate potential 
abuses of power in the evolving frame of new energy weapon technologies? 
We can learn from the case of existing CED implementation. Although 
CED technology is different from that of ADS and other less lethal 
weapons, it is similarly subject to concerns about abuse, auditing, and 
health effects on human targets. Technology based on energy that can be 
fired at targets from a distance often does not leave markings behind on the 
body of the target. “Human rights groups say that equipping police with 
                                                                                                                              
70 Healy, supra note 8. 
71 Brad Turner, Cooking Protestors Alive: The Excessive-Force Implications of the Active 
Denial System, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 332, 343 (2007). “The ADS works invisibly 
and inaudibly . . . instead of watching imagery reminiscent of Mohatma Ghandi or the 
great nonviolent protests of the civil rights era, television and internet viewers will see 
what looks to be a strange, perhaps even humorous scene, where one minute student 
protestors are standing their ground and the next they are scattering for no discernible 
reason.” Id. at 355. 
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such weapons would add to the problems posed by existing ‘non-lethals’ 
such as Tasers.”72 
The rest of this article is structured as follows: having already discussed 
advances in less lethal technologies, we analyze current implementations 
with CEDs and conclude with recommendations as weapons and 
surveillance technologies continue to evolve. We use the case of CEDs, 
which have been deployed in law enforcement agencies across the United 
States, in order to weigh the risks and advantages of less lethal energy 
weapons. To preview the result, we observe that CEDs are often used 
against suspects who pose no imminent danger to public safety including 
suspects who are passive or are not resistant, suspects who demonstrate 
only verbal resistance, and fleeing suspects. When too broad, CED 
deployment unnecessarily subjects targets to pain and risk for injury as well 
as violations of their constitutional rights. Finally, we advance a number of 
recommendations for civilian oversight of law enforcement given the risks 
and advantages of rapidly developing nonlethal technologies. With more 
complete knowledge of local law enforcement practices, stakeholders will 
be better able to design policies that are appropriate to technological 
advances and the increasing militarization of our police. 
IV. A CASE STUDY OF LESS LETHAL WEAPONS: CONDUCTED 
ENERGY WEAPONS OR TASERS 
Controversy has grown alongside increased CED purchases. CEDs, also 
known as tasers or “stun guns,” deliver “up to 50,000 volts of electricity 
intended to incapacitate their victims.”73 In 2000, about 500 law 
enforcement agencies had purchased tasers; but by 2011, about 16,000 law 
                                                                                                                              
72  Hambling, supra note 56.  
73  COREY STOUGHTON ET AL., TAKING TASERS SERIOUSLY: THE NEED FOR BETTER 
REGULATION OF STUN GUNS IN NEW YORK 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/nyclu_TaserFinal.pdf. 
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enforcement agencies in the United States had them in use.74 Recent 
evaluations of CED safety report that they reduce the odds of medical injury 
for both suspects and officers.75 A study entitled The Impact of Conducted 
Energy Devices and Other Types of Force and Resistance on Officer and 
Suspect Injuries found that “whereas CEDs and OC spray [oleoresin 
capsicum or pepper spray], which typically are deployed some distance 
from resistive or combative suspects, were associated with injury reduction, 
the use of hands on tactics that require officers to be in close physical 
proximity to suspects to effect arrests was associated with an increased risk 
of injury to both officers and suspects.”76 
Nonetheless, one of the biggest risks to suspects targeted with CEDs is 
that exposure could be a contributing factor to the suspect’s increased heart 
rhythm.77 Studies with healthy male subjects usually find that CEDs are 
painful but have no long-term impact on the health of the subject. In one 
study conducted in 2007, 105 police trainees were exposed to short Taser 
bursts, and the study found that none of the police trainees experienced 
cardiac dysrhythmias or morphologic changes.78 However, Americans are 
                                                                                                                              
74 Id. Also note that Taser is a specific commercial brand but the term “tasers” connotes 
CEDs broadly. 
75 BRUCE TAYLOR ET AL., COMPARING SAFETY OUTCOMES IN POLICE USE-OF-FORCE 
CASES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES THAT HAVE DEPLOYED CONDUCTED 
ENERGY DEVICES AND A MATCHED COMPARISON GROUP THAT HAVE NOT: A QUASI-
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Use_of_Force/conduct
ed%20energy%20devices%20matched%20agency%20study%202009.pdf. 
76 Michael R. Smith et al., The Impact of Conducted Energy Devices and Other Types of 
Force and Resistance on Officer and Suspect Injuries, 30 POLICING: AN INT’L J. OF 
POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 423, 439 (2007). 
77 Douglas Zipes, TASER Electronic Control Devices Can Cause Cardiac Arrest in 
Humans, 129 CIRCULATION 101, 119 (2014); Erica Goode, Tasers Pose Risks to Heart, a 
Study Warns, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/01/health/research/taser-shot-to-the-chest-can-kill-a-
study-warns.html?_r=0/. 
78 Saul D. Levine et al., Cardiac Monitoring of Human Subjects Exposed to the Taser, 33 
J. EMERGENCY MED. 113, 113–117 (2007). 
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faced with a number of prevalent health conditions that pose extra risks for 
large segments of the population. For example, obesity is a national 
epidemic.79 Thus, police officer trainee test subjects at the height of the 
physical fitness pyramid are clearly not representative of the population. If 
preexisting conditions such as intoxication are present, heart stimulation 
could induce ventricular fibrillation.80 Additionally, exposure could be 
harmful or even life-threatening for other at-risk populations.81 Suspects are 
also at risk of falling after being tased. One study indicated that six 
individuals died after CED exposure caused them to fall and strike their 
heads.82 
Equally important in the area of risk is overuse in initially low-level 
incidences. Best practices means that, “officials should be trained to 
recognize mere non-compliance stemming from a communication 
breakdown does not warrant CED use absent an imminent threat of 
significant physical harm”;83 however, as we will see, CEDs have not 
infrequently been used against subjects who pose no physical danger to 
themselves, to officers, or to any other members of the public. 
                                                                                                                              
79 Karen Kaplan, Obese Americans Now Outnumber Those Who Are Merely Overweight, 
Study Says, L.A. TIMES (June 22, 2015, 2:53 AM), http://www.latimes.com/science/la-
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80 Kumaraswamy Nanthakumar et al., Cardiac Stimulation with High Voltage Discharge 
from Stun Guns, 178 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1451, 1456 (2008). 
81 Jared Strote & H. Range Hutson, Taser Safety Remains Unclear, 52 ANNALS OF 
EMERGENCY MED. 84, 84 (2008). 
82 Mark W. Kroll et al., Sensitive Swine and TASER Electronic Control Devices, 15 
ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 695, 695–96 (2008); Electronic Control Devices, 179 
CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 342, 343 (2008). “There are at least 6 cases of deaths from 
head injuries resulting from falls in which an electronic control device may have 
contributed to the fall, International warns of this risk in its training materials.” Id.  
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 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MARYLAND, POLICY ON CONDUCTED ENERGY 
DEVICES AND BEST PRACTICES GUIDELINES 1 (2009), http://www.aclu-
md.org/uploaded_files/0000/0045/aclumd_taser_policy_7-2009.pdf. 
124 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Courts are likely to find CED use appropriate only if this use of force is 
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.84 Graham v. Connor 
sets out the test to determine if a use of force is objectively reasonable.85  
Factors that courts have considered in determining whether a force was 
appropriate include: degree or severity of the crime, whether the suspect 
posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and 
whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 
arrest by flight.86 These factors must be considered based on the totality of 
the circumstances.87 
Courts have agreed that use of force is least justified against nonviolent 
misdemeanants who do not flee or actively resist arrest and pose little to no 
threat to the security of the officers or the public.88  In such situations, the 
use of a Taser is unconstitutional and is considered excessive force.89  
When subjects show slightly more resistance (e.g., questioning the police 
officer as to the reason for arrest), this was still not enough to constitute 
aggression or physical resistance. While courts are unclear as to whether the 
questioning of one’s arrest would constitute verbal resistance, courts have 
nevertheless found that an arrestee’s inquiry was insufficient to establish 
probable cause to justify the use of a CED.90 
                                                                                                                              
84 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). 
85 Id. at 397. 
86 Id. at 396. 
87 Id. 
88 Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 497 (8th Cir. 2009). A Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals references national studies and police research organizations, which 
“agree that tasers are at least an intermediate level of force.” Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 
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89  Casey v. City of Federal Heights, 509 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2007). 
90 DeSalvo v. City of Collinsville, Ill., No. 04-CV-0718-MJR, 2005 WL 2487829, at *3 
(S.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2005). 
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If an officer tases a subject who is fleeing for fear of his or her physical 
safety, this use of force is considered excessive and in clear violation of the 
subject's Fourth Amendment right.91 Further, even when a subject is not 
necessarily fleeing for fear of his physical safety, one court has still found 
that the use of a Taser could be unconstitutional in light of the 
circumstances.92 The court reasoned that the level of force used must take 
into account the circumstances, not simply the type of force usually 
associated with a particular weapon.93 The court used the force of a shove to 
demonstrate this concept. In a normal situation, a shove is an insignificant 
amount of force. However, when a subject is perched on a ledge of a 
building, a shove can be a deadly force.94 
In cases where subjects exhibited minor and/or severe aggression, courts 
have found that the use of a CED is unconstitutional unless the jury could 
find that the officer had probable cause to believe that the subject was 
dangerous to the police or to the public.95 
Hence, as our discussion of the case law has shown, suspects who are not 
an imminent danger to public safety may be subject to unnecessary and 
excessive force from CED deployment. Tasers may decrease the risk of 
medical injury to officers and suspects in police-civilian encounters, but 
they increase other risks, such as more use of force in situations not 
warranting force. Some officials have expressed concerns about their role in 
policing, such that officers may resort to CEDs to gain compliance over a 
suspect from a distance and bypass traditional methods of de-escalation 
                                                                                                                              
91 C.f., Roberts v. Manigold, 240 F. App’x 675, 678 (6th Cir. 2007). 
92 C.f.,See Snauer v. City of Springfield, No. 09-CV-6277-TC, 2010 WL 4875784, at *5 
(D. Or. Oct. 1, 2010). 
93 Id. at 4. 
94  Id. 
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such as talking a suspect down.96 In 2013, the ACLU found that some 
Michigan law enforcement agencies were at risk of not complying with 
federal court rulings, manufacturer safety standards, and departmental 
policies.97 Others remark that, “[because] the distinguishing feature of the 
Taser, compared with other forms of enforcing compliance, is that it can be 
used with one finger . . . perhaps this makes it more prone to abuse.”98 
V. QUESTIONS, EXPECTATIONS & HYPOTHESES 
What should we expect with regard to CED utilization? This discussion 
gives rise to two sets of expectations regarding the deployment of CEDs 
across a range of suspect behaviors. We hypothesize that a suspect’s 
(perceived violent) behavior will predict greater CED deployment; 
however, we also expect that trends will reflect substantial patterns of 
overuse as well. 
First, on one side of the suspect violence continuum (where the suspect 
displays no physical aggression), we expect steady over-deployment of 
CEDs across all category subtypes. That is, although no force is warranted 
in cases where the suspect poses no imminent risk to public safety, various 
factors make CEDs susceptible to abuse and will lead to unnecessary usage 
even in cases where a suspect is either passive or not resistant. Tasers will 
also be used in a substantial portion of cases where the suspect 
                                                                                                                              
96
  TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 75, at 70.  “Another training issue is the inappropriate use 
of the CED. As with any service weapon, officers can misuse CEDs. Misuse can range 
from outright abusive or illegal use of the weapon to less obvious cases of officers 
turning to a CED too early in a force incident (e.g., bypassing verbal de-escalation skills 
and going right to the use of the CED).” Id.  
97 Law Enforcement Agencies Urged to Adopt Uniform Policies that Adhere to Federal 
Law and Safety Standards, AM. C.L. UNION (Feb. 21, 2013), 
https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-documents-troubling-use-tasers-michigan. 
98 David Hambling, Courts to Cops: Stop Tasing People into Compliance, WIRED (Jan. 4, 
2010, 9:33 AM), http://www.wired.com/2010/01/court-dials-back-taser-use-cops-cant-
zap-to-force-behavior/. 
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demonstrates no physical aggression but provides verbal resistance or 
attempts to flee. News reports and court cases regarding CED misuse, then, 
will reflect broader trends in data on police use of force rather than a small 
set of outliers. 
Second, on the other side of the continuum (where the suspect displays 
physical aggression), we expect a positive association between CED 
utilization and perceived suspect violence. That is, those suspects who are 
perceived as having demonstrated minor aggression, severe aggression or 
an intent to act with deadly force are more likely to be tased than suspects 
who do not display any aggressive physical action. In other words, this 
hypothesis poses that CEDs will on average be deployed against more 
violent suspects.  
Together, these expectations underscore that advances in nonlethal 
weapons as alternatives to deadly force are not unwelcome, but we must 
vigorously and proactively guard against potential abuses of power. 
VI. METHODOLOGY 
The dataset we use for this analysis is the 2011 Evaluation of Less-Lethal 
Technologies on Police Use-of-Force Outcomes in 13 Sites in the United 
States, 1992-2007, which included use of force reports from both CED-yes 
and CED-no agencies.99 According to Taylor et al. (2009),100 the data were 
collected from seven agencies with CED deployment and six agencies that 
did not deploy CEDs but were matched on other characteristics. For CED 
agencies, investigators collected at least two years of data before and after 
CED deployment. For CED-no agencies, investigators obtained data over a 
similar four-year period. Agencies were invited to participate based on 
whether they would be able to provide data for all incidences of use of 
force, had a written policy in place that identified where CED weapons 
                                                                                                                              
99 TAYLOR & KOPER, supra note 11, at ii.   
100 TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 75. 
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were placed on a use of force continuum, were willing to share their data, 
and had at least 100 sworn officers.  
Criteria used to produce a comparable sample of CED-yes and CED-no 
agencies include violent crime levels (4,374 violent crimes in CED-no sites 
and 5,771 violent crimes in CED-yes sites) and police activity (1,973 arrests 
for violent crimes in CED-no sites and 1,638 arrests in CED-yes sites). The 
population per square mile for the CED-no sites was on average 3,782 
people per square mile compared to 3,466 people for the CED-yes sites. 
The CED-no sites averaged a household income of $50,386 and 8.5 percent 
of the population below poverty level, compared to $48,190 for the CED-
yes sites and 10.1 percent below the poverty level. 
Most of the data analysis consists of evaluating bivariate relationships, 
but we shift to multinomial logistic regression to confirm and expand upon 
our bivariate findings. We conducted separate analyses for CED-yes and 
CED-no agencies, since the outcome variable—type of weapon an officer 
deploys—diverges between the two, with no CED option available for 
officers in the latter type of agency. All missing data were excluded from 
the analysis. Although use of force reports are nested within agencies, there 
are too few clusters for each agency type (seven CED-yes and six CED-no 
agencies) in order to employ standard multi-level modeling or standard 
cluster adjustment procedures.101 We do not expect the size and direction of 
                                                                                                                              
101
 JOSHUA ANGRIST & JORN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: 
AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 319–321 (2009). There is some debate on how analyses 
should proceed with too few clusters, but no recommended procedure is ideal for this 
investigation. On fewer than 42 clusters, Angrist et al. write, “42 is enough for standard 
cluster adjustment to be reliable, and if less is too few, then what should you do when the 
cluster count is low? First-best is to get more clusters by collecting more data . . . [or] 
inflate the residuals in the hopes of reducing bias . . . [or recognize] that the fundamental 
unit of observation is a cluster and not an individual within clusters.” Id. The readers 
should also note that the current investigation is based on a publicly available dataset 
where site information is masked. 
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relationships between variables in our analysis to change, but we urge 
caution with interpretation where the statistical significance of a coefficient 
is marginal. Nevertheless, our multivariate findings buttress our descriptive 
findings for use of force reports among reporting agencies. Future 
investigations with a larger number of agencies (n=42 or more) would be 
ideal. 
We produce multinomial logistic regression models separately for law 
enforcement agencies that adopted CEDs and those that did not in order to 
model the type of force that officers deploy given suspect behavior while 
controlling for individual-level social and demographic characteristics. We 
adopted our dependent variable from one utilized by Taylor et al. (2009) in 
their study of whether CEDs improved risks of medical injury to officers 
and suspects. They coded their use-of-force data into five categories: CED 
use only, baton use only, OC spray use only, other weapon use or multiple 
weapon use, and non-weapon force by officers (hands-on tactics and other 
non-weapon approaches).102 Since we are interested in new advances in 
policing technology, our primary outcome of interest is CED deployment.  
Among CED-yes agencies, our dependent variable has five possible 
outcomes for the type of officer weapon deployed (CED only or y=1, baton 
only or y =2, OC spray only or y =3, other/multiple weapons or y =4 and no 
weapons or y =5). For CED-no agencies, the outcomes are reduced to four 
types (baton only, OC spray only, other/multiple weapons, and no 
weapons). We estimate a set of coefficients corresponding to each outcome 
with the no weapons category as our comparison group.103 Reported 
                                                                                                                              
102 TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 75, at 42.  
103 Due to variation in the hands-on tactic category, we cannot surmise that every 
incidence of force where no weapon is listed is a lesser use of force than that with a 
conducted energy device. However, “[m]ost applications of force are minimal, with 
officers using their hands, arms or bodies to push or pull against a suspect to gain 
control.” ERIC H. HOLDER, JR. ET AL., POLICE USE OF FORCE, TASERS AND OTHER LESS-
LETHAL WEAPONS, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. RES. IN BRIEF ii (2011), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/232215.pdf.  
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coefficients are relative risk ratios (RRR)—or the ratio of two risks, which 
denotes the relative probability of an outcome to the base outcome for a 
one-unit change in (Xi) our independent variable. In other words, 
coefficients reported are RRR that reflect the risk of choosing, for example, 
to deploy a CED over deploying no weapons. 
To fit our models predicting the type of weapon an officer deployed, we 
include variables that account for perceptions of suspect violence and 
whether the suspect was reported as in possession of a weapon, in addition 
to controls such as gender, race, and age. These variables are included in 
our analysis as dummy variables indicating whether the suspect was 
perceived as violent (1=suspect displayed behavior reported as mild 
aggression, severe aggression or deadly force, 0=no perception of violence), 
whether the suspect was reported as in possession of a weapon (1=yes 
weapon, 0=no weapon), male (1=male, 0=female), white (1=white, 0=non-
white), and age (1=under 25 years, 0=25 years and over). 
VII. CED STUDY RESULTS 
A. Descriptive Findings 
We first examine the distribution of officer-deployed weapon types 
across suspect behaviors. Because we are especially interested in CEDs, we 
examine patterns in CED deployment in contrast to other weapons usage 
categories.104 CEDs first came onto the market as an alternative to lethal 
force, but they have been utilized across a much broader range of less 
serious situations.105 Use of this painful electromagnetic device on suspects 
                                                                                                                              
104 Our tabulations showed that tasers are often used in combination with other weapons 
against a suspect. Since the experience of a suspect against whom multiple weapons 
(including CEDs) are deployed will be different from the experience of a suspect in a 
CED only incident, we focus our analysis on the CED alone group. 
105 Dara Lind, Why Police Officers Often Resort to Lethal Force as Their First Response, 
VOX IDENTITIES (Dec. 26, 2014, 10:10 AM), 
http://www.vox.com/2014/12/26/7447891/police-shoot-taser.   
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who are not exhibiting aggression or otherwise endangering public safety 
exposes them to potentially excessive uses of force and undue risks. 
Various court rulings, recommendations from mainstream law enforcement 
agencies,106 and human rights organizations107 present CED deployment 
against passive or physically non-aggressive suspects as inappropriate. 
Accordingly, understanding whether and why CEDs are used on this 
category of non-aggressive suspects merits attention from scholars, law 
enforcement officials, oversight professionals, policymakers, and members 
of the public. 
The data underscore that indeed CEDs are regularly employed for low-
level incidents. Figure 2 reports that even in cases with passive or no 
resistant suspect behavior, CEDs alone were deployed 159 times, which 
comprises 13 percent of these cases. Batons only or OC spray only were 
used a total of 36 times in this suspect category. Multiple weapons or other 
weapons (non-CED only, non-baton only, non-OC spray only) were 
deployed 499 times (or in 42% of incidences in this suspect category). 
Hence, for use of force incidents reported where the suspect demonstrated 
passive or no resistant behavior, over half included the deployment of a 
weapon against that suspect. The argument against using CEDs on suspects 
who only display passive (e.g., suspects who become “dead weights”) or no 
resistant behavior is strong, and one would expect officers to use a 
minimum, if any, force against these persons. 
                                                                                                                              
106 Michael E. Miller, Taser Use and the Use-of-Force Continuum: Examining the Effect 
of Policy Change, THE POLICE CHIEF (Sept. 2010), 
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&artic
le_id=2204&issue_id=92010. 
107 Law Enforcement Agencies Urged to Adopt Uniform Policies, AM. C.L. UNION (Feb. 
21, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-documents-troubling-use-tasers-michigan; 
Miller, supra note 106; AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL’S CONCERNS 
ABOUT TASER® USE: STATEMENT TO THE U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT INQUIRY INTO 
DEATHS IN CUSTODY (2007), available at 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/60000/amr511512007en.pdf. 
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108 Figures report percentages for the distribution of officer weapons within each suspect 
behavior category based on authors' calculations of Evaluation of Less-Lethal 
Technologies on Police Use-of-Force Outcomes in 13 Sites in the United States, 1992-
2007 dataset. TAYLOR & KOPER, supra note 11 (ICPSR 27561-0003). Item Wording: (1) 
Suspect Behaviors: “For each suspect who was involved in the incident, what was the 
suspect’s . . . BEHAVIORS DURING INCIDENT? Please mark all that apply—
Passive/dead weight, Verbal resistance, Fleeing, Mild aggression (e.g., pushing, 
slapping), Severe aggression (e.g., punching, kicking), Deadly force, Other (please 
specify).” “Other” responses were masked in the public dataset and these are excluded 
from the analysis. (2) Officer Weapons Employed in Use of Force Incidents: “For each 
officer who was involved in the incident, what was the officer’s . . . WEAPON(S) used? 
Please mark all that apply—Personal issue chemical agents, Conducted Energy Device, 
Straight or side-handle baton, Expandable baton, Firearms, Weapon-deployed chemical 
agents, Other impact munitions, Other (please specify).” Responses were coded into one 
of five categories for weapons deployment: CED only, Baton only, OC Spray Only, 
Other Weapons (including multiple weapons), and No Weapons Listed (physical or 
hands-on only). Special attention is given to CED utilization, since the article focuses on 
weighing risks with advances in less lethal technologies. 
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109 Figures report percentages for the distribution of officer weapons within each suspect 
behavior category based on authors’ calculations from Evaluation of Less-Lethal 
Technologies on Police Use-of-Force Outcomes in 13 Sites in the United States, 1992-
2007 dataset. TAYLOR & KOPER, supra note 11(ICPSR 27561-0003). See n. 108 for item 
wording. Responses were coded into one of four categories for weapons deployment: 
Baton only, OC Spray Only, Other Weapons (including multiple weapons), and No 
Weapons Listed (physical or hands-on only). 
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Verbal resistance from suspects and fleeing suspects are two categories 
where the use of CEDs is controversial. The tension with verbal resistance 
is that suspects have fundamental rights to free speech but they may anger 
officers with their objections even though they pose no danger to public 
safety. Absent threats to harming anyone, firing a CED on a suspect who 
merely verbally resists is questionable. Other factors affect whether fleeing 
suspects justifiably can be fired upon with a CED, especially in those 
scenarios where the subject who might get away is suspected of only a 
minor crime and poses no imminent danger to public safety. Fleeing 
suspects, as well as suspects who are in an elevated position (well above 
ground), are in danger of falling with no ability to cushion the impact with 
their hands or legs because their bodies are immobilized subsequent to 
being hit with a CED. Our data show that, officers fire upon suspects who 
demonstrate verbal resistance, about one out of five (21 percent) with a 
CED. Officers used a CED to fire at fleeing suspects in 26 percent of 
incidents in this suspect behavior category. Again, these individuals were 
not categorized as manifesting physical aggression in the use of force 
reports. 
Cases where suspects pose an imminent danger to public safety provide a 
test for CED implementation on the other side of the suspect behavior 
spectrum. Ideally, CEDs would not be fired at individuals who pose no 
resistance, passive resistance, verbal resistance, or are simply fleeing. CEDs 
are designed to replace lethal force in situations where the suspect displays 
aggression.110 Where the suspect displays physical aggression, we 
anticipated greater CED use—and this hypothesis is supported. Where the 
suspect attempts to act with deadly force, CEDs are deployed alone 43 
percent of the time. Where the suspect category includes those who display 
severe aggression, CEDs only are deployed by officers 17 percent of the 
                                                                                                                              
110 Smith et al., supra note 76, at 439. 
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time. In cases where the suspects display mild aggression, CEDs only are 
used 24 percent of the time. 
Therefore, both our expectations are supported. First, we predicted steady 
over-deployment of CEDs across low-level resistance categories and this is 
supported. We found that CEDs are deployed in a substantial number of 
cases of low-level resistance from suspects who do not comprise immediate 
dangers to public safety, including those who offer no resistance and those 
who are only passively resistant. Second, we hypothesized that CED usage 
would be more likely in cases with suspects who were perceived as violent. 
Although the data underscored that CEDs may be used in excess where the 
suspect poses no danger, they are indeed more likely to be used for cases 
with suspects perceived as dangerous. These data buttress the hypothesis 
that the use of CEDs is nonlinear across the continuum of suspect 
behaviors. 
A comparison of CED-yes agencies and CED-no agencies paints a mixed 
picture for use of force. According to our tabulations (table not shown), this 
contrast highlights that CEDs are preferred to batons only and OC spray 
only across the range of suspect behaviors in CED agencies. Conversely, 
officers in CED-no agencies seem to employ a range of tactics across 
suspect behaviors, rather than favoring available less lethal weapons such as 
the baton only or OC spray only. That is, in CED-no agencies, across all 
categories, deploying other/multiple weapons is more popular than for CED 
agencies, ranging in utilization from almost half at 47 percent of the time in 
use of force reports for severe aggression to 71 percent of the time for 
suspects who demonstrate deadly force. 
For CED deploying agencies in the study, the report on CED use is 
mixed. CEDs may substitute for lethal force in situations with suspects who 
may pose an imminent danger to public safety; however, they are also 
employed excessively at the other end of the spectrum including against 
those with only passive resistance and those who display no resistant 
behavior. For CED-no agencies, the proportion of cases in which officers 
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deploy no weapons is approximately equal across most suspect behavior 
categories, including verbal resistance (18 percent), mild aggression (16 
percent), severe aggression (20 percent), and deadly force (18 percent).  No 
weapons were listed in higher proportions among CED-no agencies for 
incidences where the suspects showed either passive or no resistance (48%) 
or were fleeing (24%). 
 Although the agencies that deployed CEDs in the study were matched to 
agencies that did not across a range of variables, the former have many 
higher reported uses of force (2527 incidences where a weapon was used in 
CED-yes agencies versus 964 incidences for CED-no agencies, with an 
average of 361 incidences per CED-yes site and 161 per CED-no site). One 
explanation for this could be that there are one or more unobserved factors 
that are driving the use of force reports at the CED deploying agencies. For 
example, perhaps there is a different culture of reporting between CED-yes 
and CED-no agencies, such that agencies with CEDs are predisposed to 
documenting a wider range of uses of force.  
B. Multivariate Findings 
Having determined bivariate patterns in use of force across categories of 
suspect behavior, we now shift to an evaluation of the predictors of officer 
use of force in a multivariate analysis. For example, we assess whether 
perceived suspect violence is the major predictor of the deployment of 
CEDs (and other weapons) over no weapons. We test whether suspects who 
are perceived as violent will be subject to more weapons deployment in 
comparison to the no weapons base outcome. We include gender, race, and 
age measures as controls in our analysis. We also include a measure of 
whether the suspect had a gun, which is entered into the model equation 
independent of the suspect’s perceived violent or non-violent behavior. We 
conducted separate analyses for CED-yes and CED-no agencies, since the 
outcome variable—the type of weapon an officer deploys—diverges 
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between the two, with no full CED option available for officers in the latter 
type of agency. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, officers are more likely to deploy a 
weapon when the suspect is perceived as violent in CED agencies. 
Specifically, the RRR of an officer choosing to deploy a CED over no 
weapon for a suspect who is perceived as violent (versus non-violent) is 
2.64 (p<.001). Similarly, the RRR for an officer choosing to deploy a baton 
only or OC spray only over no weapon given a suspect’s perceived violence 
is 11.63 (p<.001) and 3.94 (p<.001), respectively. The relative risk ratio for 
an officer choosing to deploy other/multiple weapons with the same criteria 
is 2.65 (p<.001). 
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111 TAYLOR & KOPER, supra note 11 (ICPSR 27561-0003). Notes: (1) Models are 
specified as multinomial logistic regressions with “No Weapons” as base outcome and 
with all variables coded 0 to 1. Missing data are excluded; (2) Coefficients reported are 
relative risk ratios that reflect the risk of an officer choosing, for example, to deploy a 
conducted energy device over no weapon; and (3) Coefficients are shown for “Suspect 
Reported as Violent” (1=yes 0=no) and “Suspect Has Weapon” (1=yes 0=no). Model 
specification also includes controls for male (1=yes 0=no), White (1=yes 0=no), and 
under 25 years of age (1=yes, 0=no). Coefficients for these variables are not shown here 
but full tables can be obtained from the corresponding authors. 
 
OFFICER WEAPON DEPLOYED   
CED AGENCY
    
NON-CED 
AGENCY 
CED Only             
Suspect Reported as Violent  2.64 **   --   
Suspect Has Weapon  3.13 **   --   
Constant  0.10 **   --   
Baton Only             
Suspect Reported as Violent  11.63 **   1.49   
Suspect Has Weapon  0.00     1.64   
Constant  0.00     0.06 ** 
OC Spray Only             
Suspect Reported as Violent  3.94 **   2.59 ** 
Suspect Has Weapon  0.99     0.70 * 
Constant  0.05 **   0.43 ** 
Other (Not CED/Baton/OC 
Spray Only) OR Multiple 
Weapons             
Suspect Reported as Violent  2.65 **   1.82 ** 
Suspect Has Weapon  0.90     1.03   
Constant  0.35 **   0.74   
No Weapons (Base Outcome)             
 # of obs 1947.00  # of obs 1189.00   
 LR Chi2(20) 238.49  LR Chi2(15) 56.04   
 Log Likelihood 2218.78  Log Likelihood 1387.21   
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As with CED-yes agencies, controlling for other factors, our findings for 
CED-no agencies underscore that perceptions of suspect violence are also 
the strongest predictors of whether an officer chooses to deploy a type of 
weapon over non-weapons. For suspects who are reported as violent (versus 
those who are not), the RRR of an officer choosing to deploy OC spray only 
is 2.59 (p<.001), and the RRR for other/multiple weapons deployment is 
1.82 (p<.001). Hence, perceived suspect violence is the dominant predictor 
of whether a weapon is deployed against the suspect, a finding that holds 
across both CED-yes and CED-no agencies. 
The association between reports of suspects with weapons and officer 
weapons deployment varies across agency types. For CED-yes agencies, the 
RRR for an officer to deploy a CED against suspects who are reported as in 
possession of a weapon (versus those who are not) is 3.13 (p<.001). For 
baton only, OC spray only and other/multiple weapons deployment (versus 
no weapons used) in CED-yes agencies, whether a suspect is reported for 
having a weapon does not appear to predict officer weapons utilization, 
holding other factors constant. For CED-no agencies, all else equal, whether 
a suspect is reported for having a weapon does not increase his or her 
likelihood of being exposed to baton only deployment or for other/multiple 
weapons deployment. For a suspect who is perceived as having a weapon, 
the RRR of OC spray only deployment (versus no weapon) is 0.7.   
The dominant finding is that perceived suspect violence is positively 
associated with officer weapons deployment for almost all weapons 
categories across both CED-yes and CED-no agencies. When tasers are 
available to officers in CED-yes agencies, they are more likely to use them 
with aggressive suspects. This is consistent with their intended use. 
VIII. CONCLUSION  
Contrary to guidelines for their utilization in the field, we found that 
officers deploy CEDs in a substantial number of cases involving suspects 
who do not comprise immediate dangers to public safety, including those 
140 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
who offer no resistance and those who are only passively resistant. Overuse 
of CEDs as found in this study is consistent with other work. For example, 
“when looking into whether Tasers are really used against dangerous 
suspects, [Davison] notes that a review of over 112 Taser uses in one 
county in Colorado found that a third of the victims were handcuffed at the 
time.”112 Consistent with their intended use, however, we also observed that 
CED deployment is positively associated with perceived suspect violence. 
Both of these findings are consistent with our hypotheses. 
CEDs may comprise a viable alternative to lethal force where the suspect 
poses an imminent danger to public safety, but we must assess and monitor 
their use carefully so that no overuse occurs in instances where the suspects 
do not pose an immediate threat to public safety. As Americans, we have 
rights accorded to us that citizens of other countries do not. However, being 
a member of this privileged democracy means that we have responsibilities 
for the development and protection of its good government principles— 
transparency in government, the rule of law, respect for persons, and 
democratic inclusion. 
As we move forward, CEDs will number one among a class of energy 
weapons that are able to be administered from a distance without wires that 
need to attach to the target’s skin. These weapons, because they are 
invisible to the naked eye, are rife for abuse of power without detection. 
Energy weapons might be used once inappropriately against a target, but in 
a worst-case scenario with a vindictive and retaliatory police officer or 
group of police officers113 who wanted to do more damage to a target, little 
                                                                                                                              
112 David Hambling, DR Book Club: Taking Aim at ‘Non-Lethal’ Weapons, WIRED (July 
23, 2009, 5:13 PM), http://www.wired.com/2009/07/dr-book-club-prof-takes-aim-at-non-
lethal-weapons/. 
113 For example, Frank Serpico is a “man whose long and loud complaining about 
widespread corruption in the New York Police Department made him a pariah on the 
force.” Corey Kilgannan, Serpico on Serpico, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/nyregion/24serpico.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
One incident underscores his treatment most clearly, as a “patrolman [he was] shot in the 
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hindrance exists to the undetected harassment or torture of that target with 
these kinds of weapons. Adding difficult to detect (by design), easy to 
deploy weapons to the arsenal of this type of officer is foolhardy without a 
rigorous, well-trained, proactive oversight structure in place.  
Next, we consider the type of contribution that civilian oversight can 
offer to these technological advancements. The Innocence Project 
recommends electronically recording interrogations for later review.114 
However, torture with directed energy weapons is invisible. 
IX. RECOMMENDATIONS  
We list five categories of recommendations germane to oversight and the 
ongoing development of less lethal technologies. First, civilians should gain 
experience in exercising their rights to government records through public 
records requests and use the records obtained to better understand and 
oversee agency processes. Second, civilian practitioners of oversight should 
gain access to training in methods of detection and forensics, keeping pace 
with new technologies as they develop. Third, less lethal equipment should 
be designed and implemented such that the data for each discharge are 
automatically recorded and retained for statistical analysis. Fourth, civilian 
oversight practitioners should seek additional auditing powers through lie 
                                                                                                                              
face during a 1971 drug bust while screaming for backup from his fellow officers, who 
then failed to immediately call for an ambulance.” Id. But other officers report 
harassment and retaliation from colleagues as well. See e.g., Allison Bourg & Sara 
Blumberg, Law Enforcement Agencies Working to Find Balance in ‘Thin Blue Line’: 
Honor vs. Loyalty, ABC NEWS ONLINE (Mar. 29, 2014), 
http://www.abc2news.com/news/state/law-enforcement-agencies-working-to-find-
balance-in-thin-blue-line; Leslie Bridgers, Westbrook Officer Claims Harassment, 
Retaliation for Ticketing Girlfriend of Police Colleague, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD 
(Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.pressherald.com/2014/08/28/westbrook-police-officer-
claims-sexual-harassment/. 
114
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detector tests for stakeholders (including informants and officers) at the 
start of investigations or an initial nomination to a given watchlist, as well 
as during the course of long-running investigations. Fifth, agency officials 
should strengthen whistleblower protections. 
Civilians should gain experience in exercising their rights to an expansive 
set of government records that fall within the domain of “the people’s 
business.”115 Through public records laws, including the Freedom of 
Information Act applicable to federal agencies and parallel state records 
laws, civilians can request records from law enforcement agencies on new 
weapons developments, information on how these weapons have been 
deployed in the field, and official policies about how weapons are regulated 
by police agencies. Civilians can hold parties accountable by being attentive 
to this aspect (in addition to others) during the ongoing militarization of our 
law enforcement agencies. 
The development of new, less lethal weapons technologies that employ 
directed energy will complicate civilian oversight and we should make 
substantial investments in training for our civilian oversight bodies. Civilian 
oversight professionals already review complaints that come to their 
attention, but the rapid developments of energy weapons may pose new 
challenges due to an absence of traditional ballistics. We need to quickly 
move to provide formal training for civilians, oversight professionals, and 
first responders in the methods of detection and forensics for new 
technologies with an eye toward potential abuses. 
More generally, civilians in oversight, as well as first responders 
investigating potential abuses, will face almost impossible hurdles with the 
need for constant new training if they are to rely on their knowledge alone 
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in identifying abuses with new energy weapons. Civilian oversight 
practitioners can seek additional auditing powers. A better approach is to 
automatically record each time an energy weapon is discharged and to 
proactively and systematically audit all investigations across law 
enforcement agencies. This allows oversight practitioners to identify 
potential victims of police abuse of power (e.g., using less lethal 
technologies to harm an individual targeted for retaliation, with little risk of 
detection where rigorous oversight is lacking). We need qualified and 
ethical statisticians whose only job is to analyze data to identify outliers that 
might reflect excesses in public resource investment relative to the danger 
that a person poses. 
 In order to maximize public interest and minimize abuses of power, we 
also need methods to audit, monitor, and assess truthfulness of public 
officials and public employees whom we trust with power and taxpayer 
resources, as well as the confidential informants upon which they rely. 
Randomized lie detector tests for the auditing of investigations and 
watchlisting is integral, both at the start of the investigation or initial 
nomination to the watchlist as well as during the course of long-running 
investigations. Rapid advances in technology involving brain scans may 
lead to promising tools for the detection of deception in abuses of power; 
however, these techniques have yet to be proven as reliable.116 Traditional 
polygraph tests (recognizing that they do not prove guilt but rather highlight 
subjects that may merit further investigation) can substitute during the 
auditing process until other perfected technologies arrive.  
 Finally, we must strengthen protections for whistleblowers. When a 
whistleblower’s protected disclosures are vindicated, we should underscore 
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their leadership, courage, and integrity as ideal-type behavioral models 
within our respective agencies. Potential targets of retaliatory law 
enforcement investigations, watchlisting, and/or abuses with new weapons 
technology may want to report violations, but they may be unable to 
identify the potential agency involved if they lack information. We must 
take proactive action in order to enhance public safety and prevent abuses of 
power that detract from the work of good officers who are on the job every 
day. 
